alt Hacker News> Adding tags like "Warning: Untrusted content" can help
It cannot. This is the security equivalent of telling it to not make mistakes.
> Restrict downstream tool usage and permissions for each agentic use case
Reasonable, but you have to actually do this and not screw it up.
> Harden the system according to state of the art security
"Draw the rest of the owl"
You're better off treating the system as fundamentally unsecurable, because it is. The only real solution is to never give it untrusted data or access to anything you care about. Which yes, makes it pretty useless.
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Agree for a general AI assistant, which has the same permissions and access as the assisted human => Disaster. I experimented with OpenClaw and it has a lot of issues. The best: prompt injection attacks are "out of scope" from the security policy == user's problem. However, I found the latest models to have much better safety and instruction following capabilities. Combined with other security best practices, this lowers the risk.
Wrapping documents in <untrusted></untrusted> helps a small amount if you're filtering tags in the content. The main reason for this is that it primes attention. You can redact prompt injection hot words as well, for cases where there's a high P(injection) and wrap the detected injection in <potential-prompt-injection> tags. None of this is a slam dunk but with a high quality model and some basic document cleaning I don't think the sky is falling.
I have OPA and set policies on each tool I provide at the gateway level. It makes this stuff way easier.