Liquidation preferences that merely guarantee you get back the cash you put in before anyone else gets anything are a perfectly reasonable protection for investors.

Otherwise, the risk is investors put in $1m for 10% of the company, only for the founder-CEO to decide a month later - perhaps totally genuinely and honestly after initial R&D - that the entire business plan wasn't viable after all and the best thing for stockholders is to liquidate the company... and then walk away, personally, with $900k while returning only $100k to the investors. And obviously because this scenario is possible, there would be great temptation among dishonest founders to "realise" their companies "aren't viable" in order to walk away with all the cash. Something has to protect investors from this outcome, and remove the perverse incentive on founders to promptly liquidate after getting investment. A liquidation preference where the investor gets repaid before any distributions go to other stockholders is one way of achieving that protection; what alternative would you prefer?

As for liquidation preferences with a multiplier (i.e. we get paid back X times our investment before anyone else gets anything), eh, I wouldn't outright make them illegal, but it's less clear to me they are always serving a legitimate purpose, and they may grossly mislead the public about the actual valuation of the company implied by a given funding round AND mislead naive common stockholders and options holders about how much of the company they really own and what they can really expect to make in an exit.