In general I agree and suspect that memory safety is a tool that will continue to pay dividends for some time.
But there are tradeoffs and more ways to write correct and 'safe' code than doing it in a "memory safe" language. If frontier models indeed are a step function in finding vulnerabilities, then they're also a step function in writing safer code. We've been able to write safety critical C code with comprehensive testing for a long time (with SQLite presenting a well known critique of the tradeoffs).
The rub has been that writing full coverage tests, fuzzing, auditing, etc. has been costly. If those costs have changed, then it's an interesting topic to try to undertand how.
> If frontier models indeed are a step function in finding vulnerabilities, then they're also a step function in writing safer code. We've been able to write safety critical C code with comprehensive testing for a long time (with SQLite presenting a well known critique of the tradeoffs).
More like: a few people have been able to write C code where the vulnerabilities are obscure enough that we mostly don't discover them very often.
The result of the phenomenon described in the article is that the gap between 99.9% secure and 100% secure just got a whole lot wider. Using herculean amounts of testing and fuzzing to catch most of the holes in a language that lacks secure-by-construction qualities is going to be even less viable going forward.