The problem is all it really takes is one edge case to successfully break a web of trust to the point that the web of trust becomes a blind spot. Instead of distrusting everybody (which should be the default) the web of trust attempts to create a 'walled garden of trust' and behind that wall everybody can be friendly. That gives a successful attacker a massive advantage.
If we were talking about any linux distribution before stagex, I would agree with you.
Stagex however expects at least one maintainer may at any time engage in reputation-ending dishonesty or simply they were threatened or coerced. This is why every single release is signed by a -quorum- of code reviewers and code reproducers that must all build locally and get identical hashes, so no single points of failure exist in our trust graph.
Our last release was signed by four geodistributed maintainers that all attest to having built the entire distribution from 180 bytes of machine code all the way up with the same hashes.
All of their keys being compromised at once gets beyond the pale.