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janalsncmyesterday at 9:35 PM1 replyview on HN

My understanding of defense in depth is that it is a hedge against this. By using multiple uncorrelated layers (e.g. the security guard shouldn’t get sleepier when the bank vault is unlocked) you are transforming a problem of “the defender has to get it right every time” into “the attacker has to get through each of the layers at the same time”.


Replies

mapontoseventhstoday at 11:41 AM

It is a hedge, that said it only reduces the probability of an event and does not eliminate it.

To use your example, if the odds of the guard being asleep and the vault being unlocked are both 1% we have a 0.0001 chance on any given day. Phew, we're safe...

Except that Google says there are 68,632 bank branch locations in the US alone. That means it will happen roughly 7 times on any given day someplace in America!

Now apply that to the scale of the internet. The attackers can rattle the locks in every single bank in an afternoon for almost zero cost.

The poorly defended ones have something close to 100% odds of being breached, and the well defended ones how low odds on any given day, but over a long enough timeline it becomes inevitable.

To again use your bank example. if we only have one bank, but keep those odds it means that over about 191 years the event will happen 7 times. Or to restate that number, it is like to happen at least once every 27 years. You'll have about 25% odds of it happening in any 7 year span.

For any individual target, it becomes unlikely, but also still inevitable.

From an attackers perspective this means the game is rigged in their favor. They have many billions of potential targets, and the cost of an attack is close to zero.

From a defenders perspective it means realizing that even with defense in depth the breach is still going to happen eventually and that the bigger the company is the more likely it is.

Cyber is about mitigating risk, not eliminating it.