alt Hacker News> Any TLS break delayed by more than 15 minutes would be worthless.
It sounds like you’re talking about breaking TLS’s key exchange? Why would this not have the usual issue of being able to decrypt recorded traffic at any time in the future?
Edit: If it’s because the plaintext isn’t useful, as knorker got at in a sibling comment… I sure hope we aren’t still using classical TLS by the time requiring it to be broken in 1 minute instead of 15 is considered a mitigation. Post-quantum TLS already exists and is being deployed…
What you're talking about is a property called "forward secrecy". There are new techniques which have better quantum resistance for handling key exchange, but I think the point of the person you're responding to is that if you rotate keys often enough that forward secrecy may not be as essential of a property. I would say whether it is or it isn't is largely dependent on your use case and threat model. Either way, if the symmetric keys used for the session aren't directly breakable and you are using PQC for the key exchange, you can still enforce forward secrecy in a way that is only strengthened by rotating keys often.