Chalmers: “It is natural to hope that there will be a materialist solution to the hard problem and a reductive explanation of consciousness, just as there have been reductive explanations of many other phenomena in many other domains. But consciousness seems to resist materialist explanation in a way that other phenomena do not.”
"A landscape of consciousness: Toward a taxonomy of explanations and implications"
https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S007961072...
Thanks for the reference, that looks like a pretty thorough review.
It seems to me that Chalmers already precludes the possibility of physical/materialist explanations with his claim, quoted in the first section:
> There is a logically possible world physically identical to ours, in which the positive facts about consciousness in our world do not hold.
This certainly doesn't feel obvious or intuitive to me. I would expect that someone with the same neuronal make-up will have the same experience.