No, I am saying the concept of a p-zombie relies on a flawed premise. I am asking you to explain what is fundamentally "subjective" about these experiences.

How are colorblindness and extended color perception any different from full blindness which we already addressed? These are issues of scale of perception, there is nothing subjective about them. You either process the data or not.

Can you experience sympathetic pain without having already experienced pain? I don't see any subjectivity there.

If there are multiple people that experience no pain, how are they subjectively different in their experience of no pain? Really, the more I look at it, arguing subjectivity from the null experience seems a particularly bad hill to die on. If a broken hardware bus generates a subjective experience of its own absence, then an unplugged microphone has a "subjective experience of silence."

Ultimately, I still think you are describing biomechanics, not subjective experience.