>I hypothesize that only computable and decidable (in Godel's sense) structures exist
That's kinda DoA. Isn't there a proof that uncomputable things exist in mathematics, so if mathematics is true, why hypothesize that they don't exist even if we know that they exist?
>but imagine consciousness appearing only in "regular" worlds, with uniform laws and behaviors..
Why this limitation? Irregular worlds with appearing consciousness are mathematically definable just fine, easily even.
>Why this limitation?
This is not a limitation. The basis of this idea is that there is consciousness in this (our) world. So we know that consciousness can result from our set of physical laws and the set of all random events in this world . That is the only thing we know for sure, and the only place we can start reasoning..
We don't know if it is possible for consciousness to exist in a world where everything is random, or less regular..