I’m not arguing on quality of the library, I’m arguing on not getting pwned by the sheer number of transitive dependencies
If you look at the number of authors vs the number of dependencies the gap narrows but doesn't disappear. Many of the most commonly used crates are written by members of the rust foundation amd are used in the tools themselves. But it is always a concern. I'm looking forward to the upcoming option to forbid versions newer than N days at the project level. But just manually only y updating versions when you need a new feature or there is a cve works pretty well.
The problem is that trust shouldn't be so binary. We should have ways to increase trust without needing to resort to the standard library. There was an effort to do this at some point in rust but the idea was sadly not well received. Maybe it'll end up reviving itself with modern supply chain concerns.
The idea is that there could form some groups of well maintained crates that only depend on each other and have a similar amount of oversight. This actually naturally happens in c++ because grabbing dependencies is so painful, but it makes dependencies more trustworthy. For instance boost, absl, folly, etc.