These are CVEs in the base image and in standard lib dependencies. For example, just scanned an unhardened image I built today:
Unhardened: docker.io/nanoco/nanoclaw:agent-alpha
71 packages, 344 unique CVEs, linux/arm64
PACKAGE VERSION TYP C H M L N TOT
-----------------------------------------------------------
expat 2.5.0 deb 0 4 18 1 2 25
curl 7.88.1 deb 4 4 6 0 7 21
hono 4.12.14 npm 0 1 18 2 0 21
libtiff 4.5.0 deb 0 2 1 1 15 20
perl 5.36.0 deb 5 6 3 0 3 17
pnpm 10.33.0 npm 0 8 7 0 0 15
glibc 2.36 deb 1 2 2 1 7 13
openjpeg 2.5.0 deb 0 0 3 1 9 13
cups 2.4.2 deb 0 2 8 0 1 11
glib2 2.74.6 deb 1 7 1 0 1 10
tar 1.34(+2) deb 1 1 7 0 1 10
llvm 15.0.6 deb 0 0 0 1 9 10
sqlite3 3.40.1 deb 1 2 3 0 3 9
nss 3.87.1 deb 1 0 3 0 4 8
avahi 0.8 deb 0 0 8 0 0 8
util-linux 2.38.1 deb 0 0 3 0 2 7
elf 0.188 deb 0 0 0 0 7 7
libssh2 1.10.0 deb 1 4 1 0 0 6
openldap 2.5.13 deb 0 1 0 0 5 6
chromium 151.0.7922.108 deb 0 5 0 0 0 5
-----------------------------------------------------------
UNIQUE CVEs 16 68 121 17 119 344
(+51 more packages, 102 findings)
C/H/M/L/N = critical/high/medium/low/negligible.
Counts are unique CVEs: binaries from one source package are
grouped (libcurl4 + libcurl3-gnutls + curl = curl), so a CVE
hitting three of them counts once, not three times.
Are these real findings, or a situation in which fixes have been backported? At one place I worked, the corpsec guys were wildly incompetent and would try to bury me in "CVEs" in my systems that were nothing but "vulnerable" software versions with all of the "identified" vulnerabilities fixed by Debian backported patches.