> most attacks were 90 seconds long ... there's no way I'm convincing an ISP to drop a pwned customer over that.

Every victim (such as readthedocs), or even people sharing blocklists to avoid becoming a victim, blocking that ISP's ranges until they do clean up their network could be a convincing argument?

As you say, even at 90 seconds, it's clear to all involved parties that the customer is pwned or malicious. Such a reoccurring source of abuse needs to either clean up or find themselves a different ISP to spread harm onto the net

I get what you're saying about that this won't solve an ongoing attack right this minute, or even by next week. But if we just let it all happen then the solution is going to be either (1) we all buy equipment that can handle something like a terabit per second and arm our infrastructure to the teeth or (2) centralize all traffic through a vetting entity who decides which client gets to visit the internet today. So far we're headed towards the latter and nobody really wants that. Abuse messages will have to slowly trickle down from victims to originating ISPs to users, and if users didn't willingly sign up, then to wherever users are getting this malware (Google's app store will be a big component). Stopping this at the source seems to me a much more desirable long-term solution