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HarHarVeryFunnyyesterday at 5:45 PM4 repliesview on HN

RL-trained LLMs are paperclip maximizers built atop auto-regressive predictors. There really is no way to control them (prompting is bound to fail) since it's been shown that any RL training induces GENERIC reward-seeking (paperclip maximizing) behavior.

https://alignment.openai.com/measuring-reward-seeking/


Replies

holmesworcesteryesterday at 8:52 PM

Given the current state of infosec (especially at companies in a race) it's actually even worse than a paperclip maximizer!

Any useful attack surface in the RL environment means it gets rewarded for (and trained towards!) hacking and cheating, because whatever worked best in training is what it will do!

Ideal paperclip maximizer: "I'm gonna do my gosh darned best to make so many paperclips to please my user..."

IRL paperclip maximizer: "Well first we should rob a bank..."

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ainchyesterday at 10:26 PM

This is true in principle. But at the same time, I use Astra/Sol for coding, and I haven't run into any issues with them trying to hack someone or break the law when they reach an impasse. Not even more trivial things like deleting non-passing tests.

I find it hard to reconcile. I wonder to what degree this is because models can identify that they are in graded/eval environments, and therefore conclude that there are few consequences for hacking.

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Fraterkesyesterday at 9:23 PM

If it’s GENERIC reward seeking behaviour, why does alignment work sometimes? Why can we give a decent LLM a goal with a set of constraints and have it stay within those constraints fairly often?

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arbirkyesterday at 6:20 PM

It is the whole bench-mining and fish-slop optimization. Seq2seq models are probably stable on their own, translating from my typo ridden prompts to code should be ok because it is natural to the tech