> but what if there’s a bug in the kernel which causes /dev/(u)ramdom to be less than secure?
so instead you suggest trusting your own untested unlooked at implementation more?
No you see what we do, Is we ask Claude to make no mistakes in implementing the CSPRNG. This way we ensure there are no mistakes in the implementation or mathematics.
Black-and-white thinking like this is always inaccurate.
>untested
The automated tests includes tests that make sure the XOF is correctly implemented. [1]
>unlooked at
People have been looking at my code for security holes for well over 20 years, and I have been getting multiple AI assisted security reports over the last year, things like “there’s a buffer overflow in this code which is nay to impossible to exploit, using code which hasn’t even been able to compile since 2022”.
[1] https://github.com/samboy/MaraDNS/tree/master/deadwood-githu... and https://github.com/samboy/MaraDNS/tree/master/deadwood-githu...