alt Hacker News> Synthesizing complex information from a range of technical sources enough to build bioweapons is cognitively impenetrable for the vast majority of people. The ability of AI to synthesize this information into a step-by-step recipe to follow is a step change in accessibility.
I agree with this part.
> But as the barriers to entry to bioterrorism fall away and become widely accessible we may see the cost/benefit shift.
But I argue that the barrier to entry is not about information, it's about needing to build, execute and maintain a lab and production facility? It's not the theoretical part that's the bottleneck.
Or maybe I'm overestimating the difficulty of implementing such a thing, this is not in my area of expertise.
>Or maybe I'm overestimating the difficulty of implementing such a thing, this is not in my area of expertise.
Not mine either. But there is a vocal contingent of experts in biotech that have been sounding the alarm for the last couple of decades at the potential for rogue groups to develop weaponized pathogens for terrorism. And this was years before LLMs. Apparently constructing a sufficiently capable lab isn't really a bottleneck due to how freely available equipment is by mail order and how unsophisticated the processes are in practice.