Zero would be hard but we could have signed CA cert put into DNS record and from that the org itself can create the certs for that domain.

Then at the very least one of the CAs leaking isn't automatic compromise, as leaking the key still doesn't make you insecure, that would also require intercepting and changing DNS records

In practice we have Certificate Transparency Logs that let us check whether a CA has issued a certificate for a domain you control without you asking them to.

This really reduces how much we need to trust the CAs, because we can detect any untrustworthy actions after the fact. Now detecting after it happened is too late. But it does mean that mistakes or malicious actions are much more expensive to a CA. In practice this has really reduced the risk, especially to those whom aren't interesting enough to burn a valuable capacity on. Which is the vast majority of people. Though perhaps if you count TLS traffic weighted by importance that count is different.

Make dns secure and put certs / public keys in dns. Control over dns already gives you the right to get tls certs. It should just be connected directly. We don’t need CAs.

Stop validating names, start signing content.

Scan a QR code when you open the bank account, add it to the keys you trust as authorities on financial things. When your browser runs accross data tagged "financial" it checks the trusted keys in that domain and renders it only if it was signed by a key that is trusted in that domain (the domains prevent your bank from abusing that trust by causing you to see political ads or some such).

If you ever see something that you suspect is malicious, you untrust whichever key signed it and take it up with whoever asked you to trust their key. If you verify it's malicious, gossip the bad keys to your friends so they can distrust also.

For me the complexity of anything connected to public internet is now over what I can secure.

I genuinely can't say I secured a PC, when it needs to phone home for a configuration at this point.

We are most likely over the line for needing to airgap a personal PC.

I quite like how i2p does it. Public keys are part of addresses, human readable names are user defined and shared but static.

The first time you go to the bank, you do the "trust exchange" (maybe scanning a QR? People sure love that) that verifies future connections, similar to how you acquire digital certificates today when you deal with the government online and similar.

Edit: > Every time you access your bank on different devices normalizes it so that visiting a typo domain would show the dialog and many would just click through.

Show the dialog? What dialog? There is no dialogues here, you cannot login to the bank unless you've verified the connection. You do it with your phone, then you can propagate the trust from there to other devices if needed.