To be honest, git deferring to the OS is the right thing to do. It's macOS that's the problem, not git.
"Ten days later, macOS and all applications that rely on it still trust the compromised eMudhra certificates" would have been a better title.
Yes, but the irony here is that Apple used to (or perhaps still has) forbidden using other HTTP(S) clients in iOS apps (or perhaps Appstore in general) than the built-in out of security concerns like this would address by using 1 central storage instead of multiple ones were one won't get timely updates.
Correct. I Googled to ask about location of certs on disk: /etc/ssl/cert.pem
Is it possible for users to remove the eMudhra certificates themselves? I have no experience with MacOS, so I don't know if certain actions are prohibited. To be clear: I am not suggesting that normies do this! Rather, I am asking if it is possible for highly skilled users.
Wouldn’t be true either. Stuff that uses the OS certificate store (that you can view in the keychain) won’t trust the compromised certs.
I could swear I saw that title here earlier today almost verbatim maybe even referencing the same link.
You can have it "both ways" if you want, but it quickly becomes very muddy - defer to the OS, but override the deferral in some cases.
Certificate management is fifty kinds of all messed up - and in THEORY everything is designed perfectly and properly, in practice it's all bandaids on bandaids that nobody cares about as long as "things mostly work".
I guess we are going to learn how important secure communication is based on the stories (or lack of stories) about how it is being exploited in the wild.
Exceeds character limit, but admins can modify if there’s a better shorter title.
> To be honest, git deferring to the OS is the right thing to do.
Tangentially related: I fucking hate so much that browsers now all have their own DNS resolvers and caches, it's just Another Fucking Thing to debug when you're working especially on locally hosted stuff. This is not a browser's job, it's a task that should fall to the OS.
Yeah, definitely: having lots of separately distributed and likely rarely and unreliably updated trust roots would not inspire a lot of confidence.