alt Hacker News> You can have e-voting systems that protect ballot secrecy and are verifiable.
In these systems the voter cannot verify that their vote was secret as they cannot understand, and much less verify the voting machine.
> And you can do that without providing proof of who any particular voter voted for.
Which is good for preventing the sale of votes, but keeps things obscure in a magical and correct box.
How can I tell the machine didn't alter my vote if it cannot tell me, and just me, who I voted for? The global sanity checks are worthless if the machine changed my vote as I entered it.
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I've worked on some research in this area as well (the experience of people with verifiability systems in real-world elections)
https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-031-43756-4_...
Beyond this paper, based on my experience working with election officials, political candidates, and voters, I would agree that verifiability is not well understood.
you don’t need to be an aviation expert to trust the plane will fly.
likewise e-voting systems pass through cryptography experts auditing to verify it does what it says it does.
said that the voting solution can also provide cryptographic proof that your vote was unaltered, and accounted for, without need to expose your actual vote.
the claims about database altering, are also false as the vote is cryptographically signed and unalterable.
also there is another feature where you can recast vote on top of your previous one and the last vote will be the valid one. This is crucial for countries where the bad guys can come at your place and under distress (gun) force your vote. you can then recast safely invalidating the forced vote.
e-voting solutions is really interesting and in an alternate reality I think we could have had a mainstream e-voting and more even direct-democracy vs our current democracy by proxy (elected officials)
> How can I tell the machine didn't alter my vote if it cannot tell me, and just me, who I voted for?
Isn't that the whole point of having ballot secrecy ? Even with paper vote you cannot tell which ballot is yours (or at least, a recognisable ballot is voided during the counting).
And if it could tell you that then a third party could force you to reveal that you voted "right" as agreed before.
Paper ballots with mutually suspicious representatives of all parties watching themselves during handling and counting is the only way to go for big things like parliament/presidential elections and national referendums where, in the worst case, the greatest of all matters are at stake. And foolproof method for voting is most needed when the levels of trust are at the lowest.