The funny thing is that AD has all the capabilities that are discussed here. Even AWS recommends it for kubernetes as a service account using gmsa: https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AmazonECS/latest/developerguide/...
I remember in the past where we had users in AD, we'd sign in via ASP.NET, where we had to do something to allow that ASP.NET session to be elevated to one valid in Active Directory.
That session was then used to connect to Microsoft SQL Server where access to data was set at a company level.
It all flowed beautifully.
I remember having an issue with A user delegating to Service A which then delegated to Service B. That second hop is kinda special. Service A must be allowed to re-delegate.
(I quickly googled it) The solution was Constrained Delegation with Protocol Transition...
This brings back memories.
> Human approval doesn’t scale to developers creating and deprecating testing databases, Kubernetes clusters, and CI runners at will.
Service (or gMSA) accounts handle this, and auth-integrated reverse proxies can move parts of the problem into a more tractable place.
I feel like the article also conveniently forgets that kerberos/ldap backends for SSO systems are extremely common, and solve this.
> In Kubernetes, each pod gets a service account token, which allows it to assert its identity within the cluster.
How is this qualitatively different than onboarding a new computer object or gMSA entitlement in AD?
The problems that the blog asserts affect AD (how to onboard and delegate access and trust) are inherent in any sufficiently robust identity implementation.
> As an example, GitHub automation requires personal access tokens or GitHub private keys and doesn’t work with any directory identity.
Can't you create an Entra app/service principal and use OIDC to avoid personal identities?
[delayed]
Unrelated but Infisical recently moved existing rbac features from their selfhosted version behind a paywall [1]. The discussion has had no response from the team in the past 2 days [2]
[1] https://www.reddit.com/r/homelab/s/teM83aKLMa [2] https://github.com/Infisical/infisical/discussions/9499
Damn, did you really go and change the author after the comments?? https://web.archive.org/web/20261116141704/https://infisical...
When I originally read this I thought the submitter was the author.
tl;dr - AD history - AD started as the directory for Exchange email server. NT picked up the project and added necessary bits to make it work for a company intranet.
The manager/creator of AD, Don Hacherl, relayed the early history of AD in a comment correcting Steve Sinofsky's incorrect high-level view of directory services evolution in WinNT - see https://hardcoresoftware.learningbyshipping.com/p/021-expand...
The following article further fleshed out the conflicting priorities of the various groups at MS concerning directory services. see https://hardcoresoftware.learningbyshipping.com/p/bonus-the-...
Offtopic: The font on this website has some rendering issues.
AI-generated blogspam. Also:
> Human approval doesn’t scale to developers creating and deprecating testing
> databases, Kubernetes clusters, and CI runners at will. Contemporary AD
> implementations deal with this by deferring authority. An admin token (sometimes
> hardcoded…) automatically joins new identities. [...]
> Even if you built all of the complex automations to reflect every testing database
> and Kubernetes pod in AD with automated admin approval, it’s security theater. The
> unified directory would exist on paper, but lack authority. [...]
> Modern cloud infrastructure automatically asserts machine identity: [...] In
> Azure, you can configure a machine identity in Entra ID and let Azure’s Instance
> Metadata Service (IMDS) automatically issue OAuth tokens when machines request
> them.
Okay, so configuring machine identities manually in AD doesn't "scale" to the container age, fine. But configuring machine identities in EntraID does? How is auto-issueing identities in AD "security theater", but auto-issueing identities in EntraID the way to go?AD isn't dead. It just became a cloud.
https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/identity/managed-ide...
I'm sure active directory is truly dead, this PR blog wouldn't lie.
Yeah but it kind of sucks.
Instead, we have 20 passwords for 25 different internal dev tools. We have to pay $2.99/month to some "MDM" that barely has control of the machine.
AD was good in theory, but the weight of crap implementation that had to be preserved for backwards compatibility was awful. It was like IE6 unfortunately.
Kerberos is a really good concept. That should be what we're doing instead of paying $2.99/month*mac for management.
As usual, some guy with an "all-in-one platform to securely manage application secrets, certificates, and privileged access across cloud, on-prem, and AI infrastructure" trumpets a technical decision he made (maybe seconded by a friend) as The New Paradigm In Computing. Everyone must follow or you're NGMI or something.
Who is this guy? Why should I care? Why should I listen to his pronouncement when I can see plain as day that he's wrong on the facts? (For example, contra the article, AD does do machine accounts.)
What specifically about AD makes us need something new and different in AI? It's like the guy doesn't understand that there's an API to add a principal.
The real hazard in tech isn't failing to keep up with the endless parade of proclaimed New Things, but in whip-sawing your infra this way and that way every time you read an article like this.
Use old, proven technologies unless you have a specific reason to do something else. Give the old tech a chance. Respect Chesterton's Fence.
anyone remember https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bitium ? Now google cloud identity.
This is nothing to celebrate. AD is fantastic for management.
The recent DevOps Paradox podcast covered similar ground in this week's episode "Secrets Management for AI Agents." The interviewee argues that "an AI agent is a workload and should be identified the way workloads already are, using SPIFFE and its runtime, SPIRE."
https://www.devopsparadox.com/episodes/secrets-management-fo...
AD = LDAP, Kerberos, DNS and user/group/host policy. That is not really ever going away. Particularly for on-prem large institutions with lots of machines. In BYOD environments sure but I don't think that has supplanted your traditional company issued Lenovo/HP/Dell in the majority of institutions.
Active Directly ran privately and locally/on premise for a long time, no?
Same with what Microsoft copied Active Directory from.
A central point of this article seems to be claiming that adding a device in AD is an administrative bottleneck compared to cloud. If that is the claim, it is false. By default Authenticated Users have an "Add workstations to domain" capability (AKA ms-DS-MachineAccountQuota attribute on their account) that allows a regular user to create up to 10 machine accounts with zero admin intervention.
Machine accounts have limited rights compared to regular users. AD provides fine grained distributed policy and cert managment. After decades of emperical refinement, AD is often superior to what the cloud offers including Entra. In environments with many PCs that require centrally managed policy, AD is still relavant and probably required.
I think it is also true that there are and always will be many companies that simply cannot expose these PCs to the cloud either because they're working with data that cannot be in the cloud like legal files, finanical documents, schematics or they cannot risk being tethered to the Internet. You know that little micro PC attached to the cart in every exam room in a doctors office? There is a 99% chance it is joined to AD.