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drnick1 • today at 5:46 PM • 2 replies • view on HN

> The frustrating thing about this is now you can't take screenshots of a Signal chat on Windows.

I find this surprising. What mechanism enforces this? This kind of restriction, AFAIK, is only possible on Android and iOS because users do not control the system (no "root" on user builds). On Linux, I certainly can screenshot Signal or any other "app" because the whole OS is under my control.


Replies

altairprime • today at 5:58 PM

Apps on the major platforms can opt specific windows into ‘do not allow screen capture or recording’: originally used for protected DVD content, it’s now also able to be used for secure credential entry dialogs or for Signal. The only defense against Linux will be tying device attestation status into Signal, so that I can see when someone I trust binds an untrustable client to our conversation. Linux is not necessarily an untrustworthy Signal platform, but as it stands today it is, as you point out, incapable of such protections and therefore ineligible for evaluating whether I can trust your client platform, and thus untrustable. (Unless you’re using a sealed Linux distro like Bazzite, in which case at least then one could reasonably determine whether your Signal instance is secured against local capture or not.)

ps. Yes, trust is an onion, blah blah HDMI decoder boxes, etc, but I’m limiting the problem space to ‘software solutions only’, matching the problem space that the vast majority of AI device scanning of Signal content occurs in.

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tredre3 • today at 7:11 PM

It's also possible on Windows (SetWindowDisplayAffinity). What you call a restriction that takes control away from the user's control is actually an important security feature and Wayland will hopefully implement it (with user control I'm sure).

It's not even hard to imagine why this is useful. Imagine you're sharing/streaming your screen and your password manager accidentally opens on the shared area.