Apps on the major platforms can opt specific windows into ‘do not allow screen capture or recording’: originally used for protected DVD content, it’s now also able to be used for secure credential entry dialogs or for Signal. The only defense against Linux will be tying device attestation status into Signal, so that I can see when someone I trust binds an untrustable client to our conversation. Linux is not necessarily an untrustworthy Signal platform, but as it stands today it is, as you point out, incapable of such protections and therefore ineligible for evaluating whether I can trust your client platform, and thus untrustable. (Unless you’re using a sealed Linux distro like Bazzite, in which case at least then one could reasonably determine whether your Signal instance is secured against local capture or not.)
ps. Yes, trust is an onion, blah blah HDMI decoder boxes, etc, but I’m limiting the problem space to ‘software solutions only’, matching the problem space that the vast majority of AI device scanning of Signal content occurs in.
The whole "don't trust the user's device" is almost even more problematic than it is for the DVD case. At least with the DVD case this is all by design getting in the user's way. This ends up being Signal stopping the user from doing something they want to do, on the grounds that Signal knows best (but the user is just forced to use a different app, eliminating the benefit.)
> The only defense against Linux will be tying device attestation status into Signal.
I would stop using Signal if it required "attestation," which my GrapheneOS phone does not have anyway.