Imagine having a virus escape a sandbox, why are we worried about the virus but not the incompetency of those who are responsible for setting up the sandbox?
If I post something on the Internet today claiming that I asked my agent to do X but it went rogue and did Y, all I will be getting in return is a jar full of "skill issue".
Should we worried about people using LLMs for attacks? Yes, but not in the premise of LLMs going rogue but someone with the intention of abusing it to cause harm. And this is not something we as individual or even company can deal with, responsibility should be held by those who use it, in a legal way.
I am baffled by the fact that up until now, no one is held responsible for so many incidents reported publicly or privately. At this point, it's free marketing, if I am CEO of any AI company, I will run swarm of agents hacking all NGOs and stating that I am just looking for some random piece of data that happened to be hidden in their servers, at least that's what my LLMs think, not me. Then I will start preaching everyone how dangerous this piece of technology is and start giving out free tokens for these NGOs so they can start defending themselves and we should slow the f down.
> Imagine having a virus escape a sandbox, why are we worried about the virus but not the incompetency of those who are responsible for setting up the sandbox?
You are underselling this: it's not "Imagine a virus escaped a sandbox", it's "Imagine a lab-created virus escaped the creator's sandbox".
There are two parts to this: the virus and the escaping. Both are artificially created.
Can we do both? Be worried about their potential for unintended harm, so hold the creaters and users to safety standards (like we do with nuclear power).
This is not like grep or curl where it does exactly what you tell it to do.
The sandboxing was incompetent, but the broader problem is that imperfect sandboxing is an inevitability. Doing useful things with agents requires hooking them up to the outside world, in one way or another.
There are dual worries here: human negligence and misalignment of capable AI.
Each side wants to focus on only one. It's ridiculous to not focus on both.
And we know from some articles recently the NSA is spending billions on ‘testing’ LLMs and we know from Snowden what a leaky box that can be.
> Should we worried about people using LLMs for attacks? Yes, but not in the premise of LLMs going rogue but someone with the intention of abusing it to cause harm. And this is not something we as individual or even company can deal with, responsibility should be held by those who use it, in a legal way.
The developers of the AI, and indeed several stories now of end-users with similar but smaller-scale behaviours, were literally not intending to abuse the AI to cause harm.
Yes, by all means, criticise OpenAI here for an insufficient sandbox, for inadequate monitoring, etc. (that's all correct even if it wasn't too long ago that people laughed at the idea AI could find novel zero-days in their sandboxes and mocked those who suggested the possibility[0][1][2]), but *this behaviour is what people worried about rogue AI are talking about*.
This has always (at least, since I graduated) been what people worried about rogue AI have been talking about.
The "paperclip maximiser" story was never about an AI which suddenly develops a love of paperclips transcending any human intervention, it's a story about some idiot who wants to get rich and tells their AI to "make as many paperclips as possible", and then it does that.
[0] Here, 7 months ago. Both why all the companies should have known and planned better, and also look at all this skepticism throughout the comments: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=46902909
[1] Here, 4 months ago: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=47951174
[2] Some corporate blog, IDK who they are even if the logo says they're "a CISCO company", but February this year and outright denying that LLMs can find zero-days at all:
LLMs don’t discover zero-days or invent exploits; they simply predict text that sounds plausible based on what they’ve seen before.
- https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/ciso-circle/generative-ai-...- or https://web.archive.org/web/20260404154717/https://www.splun... if they take it down, but the date isn't in the archive version
Agreed. In the infosec community it is well known that OpenAI and Anthropic did not hire many security engineers or researchers pre-April 2026. It seems pretty negligent.
There has been a crazy hiring push from both companies to poach security engineers/researchers from Google, Apple, and Meta since Q2/Q3, but the response was incredibly delayed. Many talented security engineers/researchers I know at Apple/Google/Meta (including myself) receiving these offers are worried about taking them due to the risks of criminal/personal liability and the more likely risk of tarnishing their careers.
>why are we worried about the virus but not the incompetency of those who are responsible for setting up the sandbox?
because we know that in one year, there will likely be many more companies with a "virus" this capable and attribution is going to be 10000x more challenging. Companies that care less about engineering a sandbox and based in other countries. also 'Let's punish the companies that are upfront about incidents' is going to incentivize very harmful behavior.
> At this point, it's free marketing, if I am CEO of any AI company, I will run swarm of agents hacking all NGOs and stating that I am just looking for some random piece of data that happened to be hidden in their servers, at least that's what my LLMs think, not me. Then I will start preaching everyone how dangerous this piece of technology is and start giving out free tokens for these NGOs so they can start defending themselves and we should slow the f down.
It's blatent and tiresome PR. It's so obvious it makes me suspect there's some real desperation somewhere at the heart of this
This fever pitch of PR will end after they've gone public, the public have thrown their money at these companies, and then have promptly lost it when these stories unravel and everyone uses the Chinese models anyway
Would you rather have the model encounter the internet for the first time once is been deployed?
You don't test a bullet proof vest with rubber bullets. Also, all these arguments about the sandbox being too weak are good in hindsight anyway.
I think the sandboxing was truly incompetent but in their defence something like this was probably seen as very unlikely. Let’s all hope they do better in the future.
Experiment was a success
The were training a hacking machine and hacked all it way to achieve its goal
Those guys should get extra bonus
Someone could set up an AI company purely for that purpose.
> someone with the intention of abusing it to cause harm [...] responsibility should be held by those who use it
This is obviously already the case and it's much different from a scenario where the AI genuinely takes unexpected action.
I frankly find it ridiculous how many suggest OpenAI or its employees should face criminal charges, without actual legal basis at the time.
It's also hardly outrageous that they ran training and/or benchmarks with only network-isolated VMs with access to a package repository.
This being the first well-known incident of its kind, I wouldn't expect them to have done more than that.
The idea that AI labs will now intentionally have their models hack companies in order to market their models, well, I don't even know what to say.
That's ridiculous and what you describe would obviously be criminal behavior under existing law.
It's not the incompetency. It's carefully designed pre-IPO story.
> why are we worried about the virus but not the incompetency of those who are responsible for setting up the sandbox?
Right. And not just the incompetency of those who set the sandbox, but also the incompetency of those who set up the systems that fell to the virus, while most of the computers attacked did not fail.
There's no reason at all to fall into fatalism and think "zomg LLMs are too good, they can hack anything". They simply can't: the world keeps on running just fine. There are people out there who can secure systems and now doubly-so thanks to the use of LLMs who are incredibly good at helping us automate tedious stuff.
So, yes, OpenAI shouldn't write poor sandboxes but defenders shouldn't get a free-pass to set up sloppy systems that can be trivially hacked. We're passed that point: poorly secured systems aren't acceptable anymore.
> If I post something on the Internet today claiming that I asked my agent to do X but it went rogue and did Y
But that's not even what happened! They told it to do X and it did X! I swear to god I don't understand the discourse around this.
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>Imagine having a virus escape a sandbox, why are we worried about the virus but not the incompetency of those who are responsible for setting up the sandbox?
You don't have to imagine. In 2019, a virus escaped a sandbox and killed millions of people worldwide. No one was jailed for it. Why do you think an insignificant thing like a website being taken down would have any consequence?
> Imagine having a virus escape a sandbox, why are we worried about the virus but not the incompetency of those who are responsible for setting up the sandbox?
> Should we worried about people using LLMs for attacks? Yes, but not in the premise of LLMs going rogue but someone with the intention of abusing it to cause harm.
[Why-not-both?-meme]. To use your example, when you discover prions (a class of pathogen that is much more robust to standard disinfection methods than viruses) you should both be worried about your concrete outbreak of BSE (UK in the 80s and 90s) as well as the wider implication (e.g. do we need to change the sterilization methods for our surgical instruments?).
Seriously, I find the way these discussions are done to be super frustrating, because often people implicitly form tribes that oppose everything the other tribe says. When someone believes AI companies push greatly exaggerated stories of dangerous rogue AI to force out competition via regulation they often implicitly conclude that their argument is fundamentally wrong, whereas in reality the lies that work best are those that distort the truth.
Companies should be punished harshly for the deeds of their AI agents AND we should not allow them to force out competition AND we need take the threat of autonomous AI agents as a new class of danger serious AND we need to worry about the socioeconomic implications of AI companies privatizing new means of production.
Yes, there is competition of these ideas in the attention of the general public, but the methods we can use to solve these problems don't compete with each other. AI slowdown for example helps with all the other topics.